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growth or job creation, those arguments most frequently used by subsidy advocates.  The 
paper also relates survey evidence showing that economists in general oppose sports 
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State and local governments in the United States have long been called upon to subsidize 
the construction of stadiums and arenas.  Indeed, the first wave of government 
subsidization dates to the years between 1917 and 1926, the first boom in stadium 
construction.  Since then, one thing that has changed substantially is the rationale for 
public-sector support.  In 1926, The Playground said the goal was for “the stadium to 
have as broad a use as possible.”  It recommended the once-familiar horseshoe shape 
because it facilitated egress via the open end and included a long straightaway suitable 
for a procession.  The implicit rationale was for the facility to serve the broad public   2
interest by hosting pageants, parades, rallies, and festivals, as well as sporting contests of 
all sorts from track and field to football and baseball.  Today, stadium subsidization 
focuses on a single use, namely, hosting professional sports franchises, which usually 
have substantial control over the facilities’ availability for other events. 
The change from public provision of venues available for a wide array of events 
to public subsidization of largely privately controlled facilities is a fairly recent 
phenomenon.  The change occurred gradually. The first steps may have occurred with 
baseball-franchise relocations –the Braves’ relocation in 1953 from Boston to 
Milwaukee, the Browns in 1954 from St. Louis to Baltimore, and the Athletics in 1955 
from Philadelphia to Kansas City.  In each case, new or recently renovated publicly 
owned facilities were made available to baseball franchises on quite generous terms.  For 
example, The New York Times reported on March 15, 1953 that the Braves were offered a 
flat rental of $1,000 for the first two years on the new County Stadium in Milwaukee.
1   
Ralph Wulz (1957) argued that public ownership of stadiums was justified if 
“private enterprise could not provide the service which the public demanded and at the 
same time realize an adequate profit on its investment.”  However, Wulz did not foresee 
private businesses being subsidized in their use of these facilities, stating that 
subsidization might be suitable for “governmental activities and perhaps activities at 
which no admission is charged,” but that “commercial type activities pay the full cost of 
the services or facilities which are provided” (93).   
                                                 
1 It may be that what has come to be known as the major league city argument for attracting a professional 
sports franchise came from Lou Perini, President of the Boston Braves, discussing his decision to move the 
team to Milwaukee.  The New York Times article quotes him as saying “Maybe Milwaukee isn’t a major 
league city. I don’t know, but I feel it will become one.”     3
Wulz’s (1957) discussion raises the question of the possible theoretical 
justification for the subsidies we see today.  Subsidies can, in general, be justified either 
on efficiency or distributive grounds.  For example, a subsidy could be justified if the 
unsubsidized market would supply too little of the good.  This is the classic situation of 
positive externalities.  The subsidy would induce greater provision.  Alternatively, 
subsidies could be justified as a means of redistribution.  For example, public education is 
paid for out of taxes, with wealthier individuals paying more in taxes than the cost of the 
services they receive and poorer individuals paying less than the full cost of the 
education.  We will address each of these justifications for stadium and arena subsidies in 
turn. 
To justify a stadium subsidy on efficiency grounds requires an explanation of how 
the market outcome will result in “too little” quantity.  That is, one must explain how 
marginal social benefit from the stadium exceeds the marginal social cost.  A difficulty in 
this case is that sports facilities are very lumpy; the debate often focuses on building or 
not building a facility, not about increasing the seating capacity by an additional seat.  
The market outcome, therefore, may be no construction of a stadium or an arena at all, 
and consequently no sporting events.  This is the market failure justification implicit in 
the “build it and they will come” strategy of cities whose intent is to lure an existing 
franchise away from some other city or to induce a professional league to grant the city 
an expansion franchise.  It is also the justification for a city to replace an existing facility 
to keep the current team or teams from moving.   
A recent example from the NBA illustrates the kind of thing that often goes on 
now. The Seattle Supersonics were unhappy with their former home, KeyArena, and   4
sought to have the city of Seattle build a new arena.  Seattle refused and the team 
explored moving, which would require breaking their lease with the City of Seattle for 
KeyArena.  A lawsuit ensued and they settled out of court, with the team moving to 
Oklahoma City, for the 2008-2009 season, and paying Seattle tens of millions of dollars 
to break the lease.  Oklahoma City attracted the team by promising to spend $100 million 
renovating its existing arena to bring it up to current NBA standards and an additional 
$20 million to construct a practice facility. The existing arena in Oklahoma City was built 
without an occupant during the 1990s as part of a downtown redevelopment plan.  The 
Seattle-Oklahoma City case suggests relevant lessons: Professional sports leagues are 
able to restrict entry and play one city off against another to extract the best subsidy deal. 
In doing so, there is a significant positional element—one city’s fan-base loses, another 
gains. And teams exploit the cities where politics most effectively taps the taxpayers. 
In this paper we examine the economic research on subsidies for sports 
franchises, stadiums, and mega-events. We ask whether economists who conduct such 
research reach a conclusion. Our investigation suggests that such economists largely 
agree that subsidization is undesirable. Before turning to the economic literature, we 






   5
The Average Economist Opposes Sports Subsidies 
 
Survey evidence indicates that on some policy issues economists in general hold 
views different from those who specialize in the issue.
2 When it comes to sports 
subsidies, however, both sets of economists appear to agree. In a 2005 survey of a 
random sample of American Economic Association members, Robert Whaples (2006) 
asked of agreement with the following: 
 
Local and state governments in the U.S. should eliminate subsidies 
to professional sports franchises. 
 
Possible responses were “Strongly Disagree,” “Disagree,” “Neutral,” “Agree,” and 
“Strongly Agree.” Figure 1 shows that 58 percent strongly agreed, and 28 percent agreed. 
About 10 percent were “neutral.” Only 5 percent disagreed. Sports subsidies was but one 
of about 20 policy issues included in the survey, but Whaples highlights this issue as one 
of exceptional consensus—the other standouts being free trade, outsourcing, and the 
elimination of agricultural subsidies. The sports question, in fact, received the largest 
“strongly agree” response in the entire survey.   
 
                                                 
2 For example, on rail-transit projects and subsidies, Balaker and Kim (2006) show that the specialist 
economists are mostly opposed, likely much more so than the “average” economist; on the pharmaceutical 
policies administered by the Food and Drug Administration, Klein (2008) indicates that the specialist 
economists are substantially more supportive of liberalization than the “average” economist.   6
Figure 1: Economists' Responses 
to Stadium Subsidy Elimination
















Source: Whaples (2006) 
Incidentally, similar economic intuition can be attributed to Adam Smith (1776). 
In writing of “public diversions,” meaning displays “to amuse and divert the people by 
painting, poetry, music, dancing; by all sorts of dramatic representations and 
exhibitions,” Smith favored the state’s “encouraging” such activities, but he specifically 
clarified what he meant by “encouraging”: “that is by giving entire liberty to all those 
who for their own interest would attempt without scandal or indecency” (796). Thus, 
where Smith specifically identified the form of encouragement, he spoke of liberty and 
made no mention of subsidization—whereas he did countenance subsidization when it 




   7
The Economic Intuition Behind the Case Against Sports Subsidies 
 
The consensus among economists on the question of sports facility subsidies 
likely stems from the basic economic intuition that government subsidies ought to 
address some “market failure,” and economists sense that there is no compelling case to 
be made for sports subsidies.  The argument for a subsidy always comes from a local 
context, when a city wants to attract a new team or hold on to an existing one, and we 
address these local issues.  But one can also assess the subsidy argument from a global 
perspective, which is where we begin. 
The Seattle-Oklahoma City case described above is a perfect example of the 
global case against subsidies.  Oklahoma City offered larger subsidies than Seattle was 
willing to make, so the basketball franchise left Seattle for Oklahoma City.  Basketball 
fans in Seattle lose, basketball fans in Oklahoma City gain.  Perhaps there are more fans 
in Oklahoma City than in Seattle or fans in Oklahoma have more intense preferences for 
NBA basketball than fans in Seattle, so that there might be some slight gain in average 
welfare as a result of the franchise move.  By and large, however, the franchise changing 
cities is a zero sum game for basketball fans.  The team is enriched by the larger subsidy 
available in Oklahoma, but the move is clearly not a Pareto improvement in the allocation 
of resources.  From a social perspective, a better approach to maximizing welfare might 
be for the NBA to expand the number of franchises so basketball fans across the country 
had their own local team to cheer.  That, of course, is not in the best interests of the 
current league members who derive substantial benefits, like the subsidies, from their 
restriction of supply.   8
Calls for subsidies at the local level come from interest groups and their 
consulting firms—which we call “promoters” of subsidization—who talk up local 
benefits of sports franchises, stadiums, and mega-events. As we shall see, promoters’ 
claims of such local benefits don’t hold up empirically. But such rationales can also be 
countered by simple economic intuition.  
The promotional literature often suggests that if the city attracts or retains a sports 
franchise, its people derive specific economic benefits from the presence of the team, 
including more local jobs, higher local income, and increased local tax revenues.  In 
addition, some promoters suggest that the presence of a franchise generates intangible 
economic benefits for the city.  For example, promoters consistently argue that having 
major league sports raises the status of the city and brings added national and world 
recognition that enhances the business prospects and even the self-esteem of the 
community.  For example, Oklahoma City’s quest to raise the sales tax one cent to fund 
the improvements to its existing arena went by the name “Big League City” campaign.  
The prospect of a game being broadcast nationally or even internationally from the 
stadium or arena is touted as a wonderful advertisement of the city’s virtues. These 
benefits, which the teams cannot capture, are used to justify  a local government subsidy 
for the construction of the facility. 
The promotional literature suffers from a long list of methodological and 
theoretical problems, all of which have been well-documented in the literature. Economic 
intuition suggests several of these problems: 
1.  The redistributive implication of moving a franchise from one city to another 
also applies to the context of moving a stadium from one part of a city to   9
another.  If a new stadium is built in the downtown area to revitalize that 
section of town, then at least a portion of any such vitality naturally comes 
from the part of the city around the original stadium.  
2.  Sports is one of many cultural activities within the city. For every individual 
who derives enjoyment from the presence of the sports franchises in the 
community, there are likely to be other individuals who are uninterested in 
sports or even resent being taxed to subsidize an activity they have no use for. 
Others argue that sports culture diverts people from more socially beneficial 
interests and pursuits. Before accepting that sports teams generate external 
benefits, a careful and thorough look at “external costs,” and the alternative 
uses of resources devoted to subsidies—uses that might also have “external 
benefits”—is clearly warranted. Unfortunately, such debate quickly leads 
public discourse and policymakers into a briar patch of unpriced values that 
are easily misrepresented. Thus, economists generally urge that society steer 
away from government sponsorship of cultural activities not related to 
education.  
3.  Government expenditures on stadium and arena subsidies carry opportunity 
costs which are never addressed.  Tax collections used to pay stadium debt, 
for example, could have gone for other public projects with higher social rates 
of return than a stadium.  One never knows what the returns to alternative uses 
of the funds might be because alternatives are never discussed.  These 
alternative uses could be construction or maintenance projects, on highways,   10
mass transit systems, hospitals, or schools. Or, the alternative could be to 
reduce taxes. 
4.  Whatever inefficiencies might exist in a system without sports subsidies, 
economic intuition suggests that government subsidization introduces new 
distortions and imperfections, including the excess burden and administrative 
costs of raising and spending tax monies. 
 
The Whaples survey did not ask economists the reasons for their views, so we 
cannot say that the foregoing points speak for economists in general. It seems clear 
enough, though, that economists are unlikely to warm to subsidies that do not plausibly 
foster a public good or serve redistributive goals. The case for sports subsides is weak, 
prima facie. Further, sports subsidies do not do much to advance political identity, as it is 
not the polity but the sport, the league, the team and their multi-million dollar players and 
managers who soak up the attention and identification. It is plausible, for example, that 
some economists warm to rail-transit projects and subsidies for their political and 
symbolic aspects, but sports subsidies lack even this “benefit.” 
Despite the strong intuitive case against stadium and arena subsidies, they exist 
and are valued in the billions of dollars.  The local promoters have claimed millions of 
dollars in benefits to the community and, apparently, their arguments have proven 
convincing.  We turn now to the evidence on the local benefits from those subsidies. 
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The Promotional Literature Versus the Economists 
 
The remainder of this paper surveys the literature on the subsidization of sports 
franchises through the provision of publicly financed stadiums and arenas to determine 
whether economists reach a conclusion on the efficacy of those subsidies as sources of 
economic development, income and tax revenue growth and job creation.  This literature 
consists of two rather distinct types of analysis: analysis done largely by academics, 
mostly economists, but also regional scientists, urban affairs, and public policy scholars; 
and analysis done by consulting firms who may employ economists, accountants, or 
policy analysts.  Work by this latter group is what we have referred to as the promotional 
literature.   
Within the promotional literature, proponents of stadium subsidies argue that 
subsidies are warranted because of the local economic development benefits of building a 
stadium or arena, including the “big league city” benefits.  They do not support subsidies 
based on  the consumer surplus derived by game attendance nor from consumer external 
benefits from such activities as talking about the teams or following them through the 
print or broadcast media.  The economic development benefits of interest to boosters are 
predominantly identified with income and job creation, and sometimes as increased tax 
revenue, and are generally called “tangible benefits” in the literature.  Because the 
proponents of stadium subsidies focus on jobs, income, and tax revenue enhancement, the 
academic literature has focused its attention on these purported benefits as well until 
quite recently.     12
  Some subsidy advocates have implicitly justified them as enhancing 
redistribution.  This justification exists both in the promotional “economic impact” 
literature and in the academic literature, with most examples of the latter appearing 
recently.  The justification is that building stadiums or arenas downtown, in the central 
city of metropolitan areas, will bring economic activity to those neighborhoods and aid in 
their revitalization.  Downtown areas, especially in older cities, have become stagnant 
and decayed over time as people and businesses moved to the suburbs.  Those older areas 
are, so the argument goes, deserving of assistance, even at the expense of the outlying 
areas.  This justification rests on the downtown stadium or arena bringing new jobs and 
businesses into the downtown area.   
We restrict our attention to the academic literature, much of which attempts to 
verify the claims of the promotional literature.  Because several contributors to the 
literature do not hold a Ph.D. in economics, we have tried to distinguish “non-economist” 
authors from authors who are economists.  A necessary condition for being classified as 
non-economist is not holding a Ph. D. in economics.  Absent information on the 
discipline of an author’s doctorate, we also report in footnotes whether the author in 
question does not work or has not worked in economics departments, and if one does not 
publish predominantly in economics journals.  The individuals who either do not hold a 
doctorate in economics or have not worked in economics departments or whose research 
is published primarily in public policy or urban or regional science journals tend to reach 
conclusions generally at odds with “economist” authors—that is, those that hold a 
doctorate in economics, work or have worked primarily in economics departments, or 
publish predominantly in economics journals.   13
  The literature initially examined data on local or regional output, income, and jobs 
for evidence of an impact from sports franchises and facilities.  More recently, the search 
for economic effects of franchises and facilities has turned to tax revenues and to effects 
on rents and property values.  Researchers have looked for evidence of economic impact 
flowing from the operation of sports facilities and from the construction of these 
facilities.  In addition, we address the extent to which subsidies to sports franchises and 
facilities are connected to the city being selected as host for a sporting mega-event, such 
as the Super Bowl or the Major League Baseball All-Star Game, and estimates of the 
subsequent benefits to the city from hosting these events. 
Both academic economists and consultants reach a conclusion about the economic 
impact of professional sports franchises and facilities, but these two groups reach 
opposite conclusions. The clear consensus among academic economists is that 
professional sports franchises and facilities generate no “tangible” economic impacts in 
terms of income or job creation and are not, therefore, powerful instruments for fostering 
local economic development. The clear consensus among consultants who produce 
“economic impact studies” is that professional sports franchises and facilities generate 
sizable job creation, incremental income increases, and additional tax revenues for state 
and local governments.  We will not discuss further the promotional economic impact 
studies but instead refer the reader to four excellent criticisms of those studies, namely, 
Noll and Zimbalist (1997c), Crompton (1995), Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), and 
Hudson (2001).  In particular, the book Sports, Jobs and Taxes: The Economic Impact of 
Sports Teams and Stadiums by Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist (1997a) brought 
together a series of papers that addressed teams and stadiums as economic development   14
tools.  The title of their introductory chapter, “Build the Stadium – Create the Jobs!” 
(1997b), indicates just how far the thinking about sports facilities has changed since the 
1920s.  Since the publication of Sports, Jobs and Taxes, a large literature has developed 
assessing the impact of stadiums and franchises on city economies.   
Here, we review the existing literature on the tangible economic impact of 
professional sports franchises and facilities published in peer reviewed journals. 
Although a small and growing literature exists which estimates the value of “intangible” 
economic benefits, we do not survey this literature. 
 
The Findings of Peer-Reviewed Economic Research on Economic Impacts 
  
The academic research on the economic impact of professional sports franchises 
and facilities, in general, comes from retrospective econometric research, though some 
case studies also exist.  In the econometric research, researchers collect time series or 
panel data from Metropolitan Areas (MAs) or states that were home to professional 
sports franchises and facilities and estimate reduced form econometric models of the 
determination of various economic indicators, typically real income per capita or total 
employment.  These analyses generate estimates of the impact of a sports franchise or 
facility on the economy.  If the coefficient on a facility or franchise variable is 
statistically significant and positive, then statistically that sports variable is inferred to 
induce an increase in the dependent variable measuring economic activity.  If the sports 
variable is not statistically significant or is significant and negative, then the inference is 
that the variable does not induce increases in economic activity or that it causes a decline   15
in activity.  When the variable is positive and statistically significant, the coefficient is 
assessed for economic significance by the researcher and compared to the claims of 
sports boosters.  For example, boosters may claim that hosting the Super Bowl will 
generate $300 million of new income, but the estimates associate the Super Bowl with 
only $30 million dollars of activity.  Academic economists interpret disparities between 
boosters’ findings and independent researchers’ results as evidence that sports led 
development is not efficacious. 
 
Professional Sports Franchises and Facilities 
There now exists almost twenty years of research on the economic impact of 
professional sports franchises and facilities on the local economy.  The results in this 
literature are strikingly consistent.  No matter what cities or geographical areas are 
examined, no matter what estimators are used, no matter what model specifications are 
used, and no matter what variables are used, articles published in peer reviewed 
economics journals contain almost no evidence that professional sports franchises and 
facilities have a measurable economic impact on the economy. 
Baade and Dye (1988) examined the economic impact of professional sports on 
the determination of annual manufacturing employment, real value added in 
manufacturing, and new capital expenditure by manufacturing firms in eight metropolitan 
areas over the period 1965-1978.  The source of their data was the Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers.  Explanatory variables included the population of the metropolitan area 
(MA), a time trend, and indicators for a new or renovated stadium, a professional football 
franchise, and a professional baseball franchise.  They found little evidence that variation   16
in professional sports franchises or facilities explained observed variation in employment, 
value added, or capital expenditure.  Only four of the parameters on the franchise/facility 
indicators were statistically significant at the 5% level; three were positive and one was 
negative.  Interestingly, this is the only paper in the literature to make use of MA data 
from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers.  This survey contains detailed MA level data 
on the composition of businesses in the local economy and should be used more often 
when assessing the economic impact of professional sports. 
Baade and Dye (1990) next examined the economic impact of professional sports 
on annual real MA personal income, and the ratio of MA personal income to regional 
personal income in nine MAs over the period 1965-1983.  The explanatory variables 
were the same as in their earlier study and they found no evidence that variation in the 
presence of sports franchises and facilities explained any of the variation in the real 
personal income across MAs.  
Baade (1996) examined the economic impact of professional sports on the 
determination of real per capita income and the metropolitan area’s share of state 
employment in the Amusement and Recreation industry and the Commercial Sports 
industry in 48 metropolitan areas over the period 1957-1989.  The dependent variable, 
real per capita income, in these reduced form regression models was transformed using a 
complex function of the average level of per capita income across the cities in the sample 
and first differences.  The 48 metropolitan areas in the sample included both cities with 
professional sports teams and cities with no professional sports teams.  Separate 
regressions were run for each metropolitan area. The explanatory variables included the 
number of sports franchises and the number of sports facilities less than ten years old in   17
the metropolitan area.  In general, the sports facility and franchise variables were not 
statistically significant, and the few that were significant displayed no consistent pattern 
of signs.  Baade (1996) concluded that there was no evidence that professional sports 
franchises or facilities had a positive impact on real per capita income or employment in 
these two industry classifications that include sports franchises.   
Baade and Sanderson (1997) examined the employment created by sports 
facilities.  The authors used data on employment from the Amusements and Recreation, 
and Commercial Sports Industry classifications of the Standard Industrial Classification 
for ten cities and their states covering the years 1958 through 1993.  They estimated 
separate regressions for each city, with the dependent variable either the city’s share of 
state employment in the Amusements and Recreation or the city’s share of state 
employment in Commercial Sports. They found very little effect of newly constructed 
stadiums or from having additional professional teams on employment shares.  When 
new stadiums were significant, their effect was to reduce the city’s share of employment.  
An additional team statistically significantly raised the city’s share in several cases, and 
reduced it significantly in one case.  Thirteen of twenty coefficients for the number of 
teams were not statistically significant.  Baade and Sanderson sum up their results by 
saying, “In general, the results of this study do not support a positive correlation between 
professional sports and job creation” (112). 
  Hudson (1999) examined the economic impact of professional sports on urban 
employment in 17 metropolitan areas over a twenty year period.  This study used both the 
number of professional sports franchises in the metropolitan area and indicator variables 
for the presence of MLB, NFL, NBA and NHL franchises, as well as a variety of   18
explanatory variables reflecting local wages, income, energy prices, population and taxes. 
None of the sports franchise variables were statistically significant, indicating that 
professional sports teams had no effect on employment in this sample of cities. 
  Coates and Humphreys (1999) examined the impact of professional sports on the 
level and growth rate of per capita income for all 37 metropolitan areas that had an NFL, 
MLB or NBA franchise over the period 1967-1994.  This study included a vector of 
variables reflecting the “sports environment” in these metropolitan areas that included 
franchise indicator variables, new facility indicator variables, variables identifying the 
first ten years that a new franchise or facility was in a metropolitan area, stadium and 
arena capacities, and variables identifying periods after franchises left cities.  The models 
contained metropolitan area fixed effects, a lagged dependent variable, and local 
population.  Although few of the variables in the sports environment vector were 
individually significant, an F-test on the entire vector indicated that the variables were 
jointly significant, and the average effect on the level of real per capita income was 
negative.  The sports environment vector was not significant in the regression that used 
the growth rate of real per capita income as the dependent variable.  Coates and 
Humphreys (1999) concluded that professional sports had no positive effect on 
metropolitan area real per capita income and may have a negative effect.   
Coates and Humphreys (2001) used sports strikes as a natural experiment to test 
for an  economic impact of professional sports on the level of income per capita in urban 
areas.
3  The paper used the vector of “sports environment variables” from Coates and 
Humphreys (1999) and augmented this with indicator variables for five work stoppages 
in the NFL and MLB during the sample period.  Work stoppages in professional sports 
                                                 
3 Sociologist John F. Zipp, (1996) also examined the impact of the Major League Baseball strike in 1994.   19
leagues are useful for analyzing the economic impact of professional sports franchises 
because they represent periods when there are no sporting events to draw outside visitors 
to a city, the primary driver of economic impact in promotional economic impact studies, 
and they are unexpected, infrequent events.  Coates and Humphreys found that real 
income per capita in metropolitan areas did not fall during work stoppages in professional 
sports leagues, supporting the emerging consensus in the literature that professional 
sports has no tangible economic impact on local economies.   
  Coates and Humphreys (2002) used a second natural experiment, playoff 
appearances by franchises, to measure the economic impact of professional sports on real 
per capita income in metropolitan areas.  The sports variables used were the vector of 
“sports environment” variables used in their earlier studies (Coates and Humphreys 1999, 
2001), augmented with indicator variables for various postseason appearances in Major 
League Baseball, the National Football League, and the National Basketball Association.  
The results indicate that real per capita income in metropolitan areas that are host to 
postseason games is identical to real per capita income in metropolitan areas that are not 
host to postseason games, disputing the idea in promotional economic studies that 
postseason games are an important source of economic impact.  The results did suggest 
that the metropolitan area that is home to the Super Bowl winner had higher real per 
capita income in the following year than in other metropolitan areas, but this cannot be 
attributable to direct economic impact because the Super Bowl is played at a neutral site.
4  
Hosting the Super Bowl also had no effect on real per capita income in the host 
metropolitan area.     
                                                 
4 Matheson (2005) finds no effect on the victorious city from the Super Bowl. Davis and End (forthcoming) 
reach the opposite conclusion.     20
  Coates and Humphreys (2003) used the same approach as in their earlier work, 
but used the analysis to explain wages and employment in two sectors of the economy 
that are closely linked to activities in stadiums and arenas: the services and retail sectors.  
The services sector includes both hotels and amusements and recreation as sub-sectors, 
while the retail sector includes eating and drinking establishments.  By looking at 
employment and earnings in these sectors rather than in the metropolitan area, their 
analysis is focused where sports-led development advocates contend much of the impact 
will be.  Coates and Humphreys’ (2003) evidence suggests that positive effects in 
earnings per employee in one sector, Amusements and Recreation, are counterbalanced 
by negative effects on both earnings and employment in other sectors.  Their evidence 
also suggests that professional sports reduce real per capita income in cities both because 
of substitution effects, where private expenditures are switched between sectors of the 
economy but are not increased, and in the creation of relatively low paying jobs.  
  Gius and Johnson (2001) also examined the effect of professional sports teams on 
per capita income in metropolitan areas.  Gius and Johnson (2001) estimated the effect of 
sports franchises on the determination of per capita income using data from all cities with 
population over 25,000 that were included in the 1988 and 1994 City and County Data 
Books. The 1988 City and County Data Books included calendar year 1985 data for 951 
such cities; the 1994 City and County Data Books included calendar year 1990 data for 
1,083 such cities.  The paper used two sports indicator variables: an indicator variable for 
cities with one professional sports team (NFL, NBA, MLB and NHL) and an indicator for 
cities with two or more professional sports teams.  Neither of the sports indicator 
variables was statistically significant at the 5% level or better, suggesting that real per   21
capita income was not higher in cities of population over 25,000 with professional sports 
teams.  
  Miller (2002) examined the effects of two professional sports facility construction 
projects on employment in the construction industry in St. Louis, MO.  Miller’s empirical 
models controlled for factors that affect employment in the construction industry and 
accounted for the effects of wages on employment in construction.  The sports variables 
used were indicator variables for the specific quarters in which the Kiel Center and 
TransWorld Dome were being built.  The results indicate that the construction of these 
two sports facilities had no statistically significant effect on employment in the 
construction industry.  This result rebuts the claim in promotional economic impact 
studies that the urban economy will experience significant increases in employment as a 
result of the construction of a sports facility.  
Lertwachara and Cochran (2007) used an event study methodology to assess the 
impact of a new franchise, enticed into a city via subsidies, on the local economy.  They 
look for a difference in the city or regional economy before and after expansion or 
relocation brings a new franchise into the city. Their evidence includes new teams from 
each of the four major US professional sports leagues, MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL.  
Their results are consistent with those in the literature and specifically with the findings 
of Coates and Humphreys (1999) that new teams “have an adverse impact on local per 
capita income
 for U.S. markets in both the short and long run” (244). 
Rosentraub (1997) asked the question of whether stadiums and arenas can 
“reverse or slow the suburbanization trends so apparent in numerous urban areas” (180).  
Rosentraub identified two approaches or rationales for building stadiums downtown,   22
revitalization and the creation of an export industry.  Indianapolis followed an explicit, 
and aggressive, policy of developing an export-based sports program, while other cities 
followed the revitalization strategy.  Rosentraub concludes, “In contrast to cities that did 
not build downtown sports facilities, the experience of cities with these assets is not 
encouraging” (205).  He goes on to say that “this first view of the potential of downtown 
facilities to invigorate CBDs suggests that great caution should be used before spending 
substantial amounts of the public’s resources on this tool for redesigning urban space” 
(206). Two authors have concluded that sports and franchises are beneficial in terms of 
income and job creation for the cities.  Nelson
5 (2001) examined the effects of 
professional sports teams on the share of state personal per capita income attributable to 
metropolitan areas.  Nelson (2001) estimated a reduced form model of the determination 
of the share of state personal income per capita that was accounted for by specific 
metropolitan areas.  The paper used data from 43 metropolitan areas over the period 
1969-1994.  The empirical model contained indicator variables for both the number of 
professional sports franchises and facilities, as well as the location of the facilities 
relative to the Central Business District.  The paper concludes that the share of real state 
personal income attributable to the cities in the sample was larger for cities with two or 
more sports facilities and teams located in the Central Business District relative to cities 
with one professional sports team, but that the share of real state personal income 
attributable to the cities in the sample was smaller for cities with two or more sports 
                                                 
5 We do not know Nelson’s discipline.  He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Certified Planners and a 
Professor of Urban Affairs and Planning.   23
facilities and teams located in the suburbs relative to cities with one professional sports 
team.
6 
 Similarly,  Santo
7 (2005) examined the economic impact of professional sports on 
the local economy. He posited that:  
Theoretically, a retro-style ballpark in a downtown or 
retail setting is likely to attract visitors from a wider area 
than its more utilitarian suburban counterpart, and is likely 
to induce longer stays and greater ancillary spending. If so, 
it is plausible that the new generation of sports facilities 
would have more favorable economic impacts than their 
predecessors. (Santo 2005, 180) 
 
Santo utilized the identical methods as Baade and Dye (1988) but extended the data 
through 2004 and dropped all data prior to 1984.  His regressions explained variation in 
income, or the city's income as a share of regional income, using population, a time trend, 
and variables that indicated years following the construction of either a football only or 
baseball only stadium. Positive and significant coefficients on the stadium variables were 
interpreted as evidence of the importance of context. 
  While both Nelson and Santo conclude that downtown stadiums have beneficial 
impacts on their cities, few economists are convinced by their results.  In both instances, 
demonstrating that a downtown stadium raises the share of state or region income that 
accrues downtown may be evidence that a sports facility redistributes income away from 
the rest of a state or region and concentrates it in the downtown area of a major city.  
Those who find no economic impact of franchises and stadiums in the local economy 
argue that one explanation for those results is the redistribution of spending and income.  
                                                 
6 Wassmer (2001) suggests Nelson’s results may indicate a healthy central city that helps build a healthy 
metropolitan area.     
7 Santo’s Ph. D. is in Urban Studies and he is employed in a Department of City and Regional Planning.   24
Both Santo (2005) and Austrian and Rosentraub
8 (2002) indicate that pure redistribution 
effects from stadiums and arenas are, or should be, acceptable from a public policy 
perspective if the stadium or arena induces or enhances redevelopment of an area that 
needs redevelopment.  They suggest, in fact, that the emphasis on improvements in 
general economic well-being from stadiums and arenas should be replaced by this 
redistributive focus despite the unclear welfare implications.  
In addition, these studies suffer from methodological problems.  First, identifying 
“downtown” and “suburban” sports facilities involves a great deal of researcher 
discretion, as the US Bureau of Economic Analysis ceased identifying the Central 
Business District in US cities in the early 1980s.  Second, Coates and Humphreys (1999) 
pointed out the econometric problems inherent in transforming the dependent variable, 
rather than using additional control variables, to account for the presence of unobservable 
factors in reduced form models of local income or employment determination. 
Recently, economists have turned to more disaggregated data on local tax 
revenues and hotel occupancy rates in their search for evidence that professional sports 
franchises and facilities generate positive economic benefits.  Lavioe and Rodriguez 
(2005) examined monthly hotel occupancy rates in eight Canadian cities over the period 
1990-1999 using univariate time series analytic techniques.  Their paper contains weak 
evidence that hotel occupancy rates were lower during the 1994 NHL lockout, but this 
result is undermined by an estimated positive impact on hotel occupancy associated with 
the departure of an NHL franchise and a finding of no impact on hotel occupancy rates 
associated with the arrival of two new franchises in this group of Canadian cities. 
                                                 
8 Austrian holds a Ph. D. in economics.  Both Austrian and Rosentraub work primarily in Schools of Urban 
Affairs or Public Policy.     25
               
Mega Events 
Much of the emphasis in the early work on the effects of stadiums and arenas on local 
economies was on their job and income creation effects, with the intent of assessing the 
value of subsidies for those facilities.  A closely linked body of research addresses the 
impact of large, infrequent, events on the local economy.  This mega-events literature 
attempts to measure the benefits to communities that host events such as the National 
Football League’s Super Bowl, Major League Baseball and National Basketball 
Association All-Star Games, National Collegiate Athletic Association basketball’s 
regional tournaments and the Final Four, and even the Olympic Games.  The linkage of 
the stadium literature to this mega-event literature is two-fold.  First, it has become 
common for the professional sports leagues to offer to cities the hosting of one of the 
premier events as an inducement to build a new facility for the local team.  Second, 
promoters of these events tout the beneficial economic impact they will have on the host 
cities. 
  Porter (1999) may have been the first academic economist to carefully examine 
the effects of Super Bowls on local communities.  His evidence, based on an analysis of 
Super Bowls in Florida and Arizona, indicated that hosting the Super Bowl had no 
detectable impact on the taxable sales of the host city.  As previously mentioned, Coates 
and Humphreys (2002) also found no effect of hosting a Super Bowl on the level of real 
per capita personal income in a metropolitan area.  Baade, Baumann, and Matheson 
(2008) examined taxable sales in Miami, Tampa, and Orlando, Florida for the effects of 
hosting Super Bowls and All-Star Games, and having local teams participate in the World   26
Series or other league championships.  The only event to have a consistent effect on 
taxable sales during their time period, 1980 through 2005, was Hurricane Andrew.  The 
sporting mega-events had little effect on taxable sales, but on average may have reduced 
the sales.  
Hotchkiss, Moore, and Zobay (2003) found that hosting the 1996 Summer 
Olympics boosted employment in Georgia counties where Olympic activities were held 
and in those counties close to the events. They conclude that evidence of wage increases 
is too weak to draw reliable inferences.  Their estimates are, however, somewhat 
sensitive to the choice of when the Olympic effects begin.  For example, do those effects 
begin as soon as Atlanta is announced as the host (September 1990), when the Olympics 
are held (August 1996), some time in between the announcement and the event, or do 
they begin only after the event?  Their results are strongest if the Olympic effects are 
dated from 1994 for employment and 1995 for wages.  Madden (2006) used a 
computable general equilibrium model to analyze the impact of the 2000 Summer 
Olympics in Sydney, Australia on the entire Australian economy.  He finds that there 
may be a modest beneficial impact for the state hosting the games, which may come at 
the expense of the other states.  Leeds (2007) examined the impact on Colorado ski 
resorts of the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics.  His argument was that skiers whose 
access to Utah’s ski resorts was blocked by the Olympic Games may have substituted 
trips to Colorado’s nearby resorts. His evidence is consistent with some degree of 
substitution, suggesting that when one jurisdiction hosts a mega-event, that other 
jurisdictions may benefit from the displaced visits.  In other words, the net gain to a host 
community may be smaller than is typically assumed.  Porter and Fletcher (in press)   27
studied the impact of the Salt Lake City Olympics.  They found that, relative to the same 
time period in non-Olympic years, neither hotel occupancy rates nor the number of 
arriving air passengers exhibited any increase.  Only the room rental rates at local area 
hotels were higher for the period of the Olympic Games. 
  Research also has turned to the examination of influences on tax collections.  
Coates (2006) analyzed monthly sales tax data for Houston, Texas over a period of about 
15 years that included both the 2004 Super Bowl and the 2004 MLB All-Star Game.  The 
results indicated that the Super Bowl did raise sales tax revenues in Houston, by about $4 
million, but that the MLB All-Star Game did not.  Coates and Depken (2006) expanded 
the analysis to all the jurisdictions in Texas that hosted professional sports, football, 
basketball, baseball, hockey, soccer and auto-racing, Division I college football, and 
several professional and collegiate mega-events.  Their analysis also finds a large sales 
tax revenue impact of the 2004 Super Bowl, but events like individual regular season 
games and even playoff and championship series games have modest or even negative 
effects on sales tax collections.   
 
Conclusion 
We offer an argument against sports subsidies based on economic intuition, 
survey evidence that a majority of economists believe that sports subsidies are 
unwarranted, and a review of the existing literature on the economic impact of 
professional  sports. Although the intuitive argument and survey evidence do not deny the 
possibility of certain local economic benefits from sports subsidies, the empirical findings 
also strongly reject sports subsidies on the grounds of a lack of economic benefits. The   28
large and growing peer-reviewed economics literature on the economic impacts of 
stadiums, arenas, sports franchises, and sport mega-events has consistently found no 
substantial evidence of increased jobs, incomes, or tax revenues for a community 
associated with any of these things.  Focusing our attention on research done by 
economists, as opposed to that of scholars from public policy or urban development and 
planning departments, we find near unanimity in the conclusion that stadiums, arenas and 
sports franchises have no consistent, positive impact on jobs, income, and tax revenues.  
If professional sports franchises and facilities do not have any important positive 
economic impact in the local economy, then subsidies for the construction and operation 
of these facilities are even more difficult to justify.  
We have not discussed the growing literature that attempts to quantify supposed 
external or “intangible” benefits.  For example, if a franchise provides a community with 
non-rival and non-excludable (public goods) consumption benefits, the value of those 
benefits may be reflected in local income or employment.
9  However, it is likely to show 
up in willingness to pay for homes and rents in the community in the same way that other 
amenities and disamenities are capitalized into fixed asset prices and rents.  
Consequently, researchers have turned to hedonic methods to determine the value of 
sports franchises to a community.  In a similar vein, an active research agenda using 
contingent valuation methods to analyze sports teams and stadium projects has recently 
emerged.  In these studies, individuals are surveyed about their willingness to pay for 
hypothetical situations, such as purchase of a franchise or stadium renovation, and the 
survey answers used to estimate willingness to pay.  Finally, researchers have estimated 
                                                 
9 However, Coates and Humphreys (1999) say one explanation for their finding of negative effects of the 
sports environment on personal incomes is that lower incomes are a compensating differential for access to 
professional sports.   29
the consumer surplus from game attendance to assess the benefits of a stadium or arena.  
All these approaches address important dimensions of the benefits a community may 
attain from a sports franchise, or a new stadium or arena. These studies may shed light on 
the issue, but again, in our judgment, economic intuition provides a strong rationale that 
any supposed local external benefits would not justify sports subsidies.  
We have seen that economists in general, as represented by Whaples’s survey 
(2006), oppose sports subsidies. Economists reach the nearly unanimous conclusion that 
“tangible” economic benefits generated by professional sports facilities and franchises are 
very small; clearly far smaller than stadium advocates suggest and smaller than the size 
of the subsidies.  The fact that sports subsidies continue to be granted, despite the 
overwhelming preponderance of evidence that no tangible economic benefits are 
generated by these heavily subsidized professional sports facilities, remains a puzzle.  
Rent-seeking generates powerful incentives for people like professional sports 
team owners and professional athletes to divert public money into their pockets. Elected 
officials are especially susceptible to flattery from professional athletes, and these 
officials are also keenly aware of the political value of keeping the local team in town 
regardless of the underlying cost-benefit calculus.  These explanations, along with simple 
collective foolishness when it comes to matters of the heart like sports, have considerable 
explanatory power. Moreover, the implicit and explicit anti-trust protection extended to 
North American professional sports leagues probably contributes to the ability of team 
owners to extract subsidies from local governments.  At any rate, we seem to have 
reached the classic paradox in which economists reach a conclusion but are unable to 
make economic wisdom decisive in public policy decisions.   30
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